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Abstract 
 In this general equilibrium framework, the transportation sector is modeled as a distinct 
sector with increasing returns.  A more advanced technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower 
marginal cost of production.  Even with both manufacturing firms and transportation firms engage 
in oligopolistic competition and choose technologies optimally, the model is tractable and results 
are derived analytically.  Technology adoptions in the manufacturing sector and in the 
transportation sector are reinforcing and multiple equilibria may exist.  Firms choose more 
advanced technologies and the prices decrease when the size of the population is larger. 
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1. Introduction 
As discussed in Rostow (1960) and Chandler (1990), decreases in the levels of 
transportation costs have significant implications on the performance of an economy.  With the 
important role played by the transportation sector, it is interesting to understand some important 
features of the transportation sector.  First, adoptions of new technologies led to decreases in the 
levels of transportation costs.  There are various examples.  For seaborne transport, Harley (1988) 
shows that the adoption of steam boats decreased seaborne transportation costs of international 
trade significantly in the process of industrialization.  Levinson (2006) shows that the adoption of 
containers led to significant decreases in the levels of transportation costs.  Stopford (2009, chap. 
1) provides a detailed discussion of the evolution of technologies for seaborne transportation.  For 
land transport, Summerhill (1997, p. 93) argues that it is unlikely that any single technological or 
organization innovation was more important in the transition to economic growth in Mexico and 
Brazil than railroads.  By 1913, social saving resulting from using railroads can be as high as 38.5 
percent of GDP in Mexico and 22 percent of GDP in Brazil.   
Second, new transportation technologies are associated with high levels of fixed costs and 
thus increasing returns to scale.  Levinson (2006) discusses the significance of fixed costs in the 
transportation sector.  For the adoption of containers, ports need to build special terminals to handle 
containers and transportation companies need to purchase dedicated containerships.  By 1986, 
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ports, transportation companies, and shippers around the world had invested 76 billion dollars to 
carry freight in containers (p. 244).  As discussed in Stopford (2009), the movement of some 
products requires specialized vessels such as oil tanks and increased volume of trade makes the 
adoption of specialized vessels profitable.  The importance of increasing returns in the 
transportation sector is also discussed in Neary (2001). 
Third, there is positive interaction between the manufacturing sector and the transportation 
sector.  Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) discuss the interaction between the manufacturing sector 
and the transportation sector in the process of economic growth.  On the one hand, the construction 
of railways lowered transportation costs among regions.  Engerman and Sokoloff (p. 284) show 
that farms with easy access to major markets became more specialized and more apt to adopt new 
crops and products and manufacturing firms close to large markets maintained higher average 
productivities and were generally operating at larger scales and had higher levels of division of 
labor.  On the other hand, increased degrees of specialization of manufacturing firms led to a higher 
demand for transportation services.  Williamson (2006, chap. 2) discusses evidence on the 
interaction between the manufacturing sector and the transportation sector in international trade. 
In the literature, going back at least to Samuelson (1954), the iceberg transportation cost 
assumption is commonly used.  One appealing feature of this assumption is its tractability.  If the 
transportation sector is not essential to the question to be addressed, this assumption is convenient.  
However, this assumption could not capture the above significant features in the transportation 
sector.  First, with its exogenous nature, this assumption could not be used to explain the evolution 
of transportation costs over time.  In reality, transportation costs are affected by the volume of 
trade and the adoption of new transportation technologies.  Second, the iceberg technology 
assumption stipulates constant returns to scale in the transportation sector.  Third, with its 
exogenous nature, it could not be used to address the interaction between the manufacturing sector 
and the transportation sector.  The assumption of iceberg transportation technology is not a good 
approximation to reality.  As shown in Hummels and Skiba (2004a), the iceberg cost assumption 
is not supported by empirical evidence.  In reality, shipping costs are charged on a per unit 
rather than ad valorem basis.  Hummels and Skiba (2004a) show that “the iceberg 
assumption is neither correct nor innocuous” (p. 1400).  Empirical implausibility of the 
iceberg transport technology is also discussed in McCann (2005).  If the transportation 
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sector is essential to the analysis, it is rewarding to depart from the iceberg transportation 
cost assumption. 
This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which transportation costs are 
endogenously determined by the volume of transportation.  This paper contributes to the literature 
by demonstrating that it is tractable to incorporate increasing returns to scale in the transportation 
sector into a general equilibrium model in which manufacturing firms and transportation firms 
engage in oligopolistic competition and choose technologies optimally and by analyzing the 
interaction between the transportation sector and the manufacturing sector.   
First, we study the case that countries are in autarky.  We assume that there is no 
transportation costs for trade within a country.  Firms producing manufactured goods are assumed 
to engage in oligopolistic competition.  Manufacturing firms choose their production technologies.  
A more advanced technology has a higher fixed but a lower marginal cost of production.  To 
determine the pattern of trade, we assume that countries differ in their effective supplies of labor 
with respect to different goods.  We show that the price of a good in a country decreases with the 
effective supply of labor of individuals in this country.  As a result, the prices of goods are different 
in different countries. 
Second, transportation services are needed to make international trade feasible.  When 
population grows, the volume of trade will be large enough to cover the fixed costs of 
transportation and countries will engage in international trade.  Firms providing transportation 
services between countries choose their technologies to maximize their profits. 
The adoption of containers can be used as an example to illustrate the choice of technology 
in the transportation sector.  The adoption of containers is commonly believed to be one of the 
most important innovations in the transportation sector in the twentieth century.  Levinson (2006) 
provides an interesting study of the history of the adoption of containers.  Before the introduction 
of containers, the loading and unloading of cargos were handled by longshoremen and were labor 
intensive.  With high wage rates, the marginal cost was high.  Compared with loading and 
unloading by longshoremen, containerization is a technology with a higher fixed cost but a lower 
marginal cost of production.  The usage of containers led to sharp rises in the fixed costs of 
production in the transportation sector.  Containerships and container ports are costly.  Also, costly 
specially designed cranes are needed since a container can be as heavy as tens of thousands of 
pounds.  Between 1967 and 1972, the total costs of containerization around the world was close to 
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$40 billion dollars (in 2005 dollars, see Levinson, p. 214).  With containerization, the marginal 
cost of loading and unloading is low.  The cost of building a container port is ten times of that of 
a traditional port, but a container port can handle twenty times of good of a traditional port.  If the 
volume of transportation is high, it pays to adopt costly containerships and container ports because 
the fixed costs of containerization can be spread to a high level of output.  The adoption of 
containers also decreased the possibilities of damages of goods transported and possibilities of 
thefts and led to decreases in the levels of insurance premiums.  With sharp decreases in overall 
costs of transportation, international trade increased dramatically. 
We show that there is complementarity of technology adoption between the manufacturing 
sector and the transportation sector.  On the one hand, we show that if the level of transportation 
technology is exogenously given, a manufacturing firm’s level of technology increases with the 
level of technology in the transportation sector.  On the other hand, if the level of manufacturing 
technology is exogenously given, a transportation firm’s level of technology increases with the 
level of technology in the manufacturing sector.  That is, technological improvements in the two 
sectors are reinforcing.  As a result, multiple equilibria may exist and an economy may be trapped 
in a “poverty trap” with a low level of social welfare. 
Our result that more specialized technologies are associated with higher volumes of 
transportation is consistent with empirical evidence.  For example, Stopford (2009, p. 40) shows 
that ship sizes increased over time.1  In 1959 the largest tanker afloat has a deadweight tonnage of 
122, 867, in 1966 the first very large crude carrier has a deadweight tonnage of 209, 413, and in 
1980 it reached 555, 843 deadweight tonnage.   
With technologies endogenously chosen in manufacturing and transportation sectors, what 
determine the levels of technologies?  We show that manufacturing firms and transportation firms 
adopt more advanced technologies and the prices of manufactured goods and transportation 
services decrease when there is an increase in the size of the population.  The reason is that an 
increase in the size of the market measured by the size of the population leads to a higher level of 
demand and thus a higher level of output.  A higher level of output makes the adoption of more 
advanced technologies more profitable. 
In the literature on increasing returns and industrialization, Murphy et al. (1989) present a 
stimulating formal model of “big push” based on demand spillovers.  In their model, infrastructure 
                                                 
1 Stapford (2009, p. 538) contains a figure of the increase in the size of container ships over time. 
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requires a fixed amount of investment.  Multiple equilibria may exist.  In one equilibrium, there is 
low level of investment in the manufacturing sector and no investment in infrastructure.  In the 
other equilibrium, high level of investment in the manufacturing sector is accompanied by positive 
investment in infrastructure.  In their model, manufacturing firms engage in monopolistic 
competition.  Because the transportation sector is not modeled explicitly, the impact of the 
manufacturing sector on the transportation sector is not addressed in their model.  In Ciccone 
(2002), there are two sectors of production.  He shows that multiple equilibria may exist if the 
sector with increasing returns uses intermediate inputs more heavily than the sector with constant 
returns.  In Murphy et al. (1989) and Ciccone (2002), firms face a binary choice in their choices 
of technologies: either a constant returns technology or an increasing returns technology.  In this 
model, firms face a continuum of technologies.  Multiple equilibria result from the 
complementarities of technology adoptions in the manufacturing sector and the transportation 
sector. 
In the literature on transportation and communication costs, Cassing (1978) models the 
transportation sector as a distinct sector in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework.  There are some 
significant differences between his model and this one.  In his model, the transportation sector 
exhibits constant returns to scale.  As a result, market structure is perfect competition.  In this 
model, the transportation sector has increasing returns to scale.  Harris (1995) studies a model in 
which the communication sector requires a fixed cost but no marginal cost of production.  The 
monopoly firm providing communication service is assumed to charge a price equaling the average 
cost of production.  Manufacturing firms engage in monopolistic competition.  The impact of the 
manufacturing sector on the transportation sector is not addressed in Cassing (1978) and Harris 
(1995).  Bougheas et al. (1999) study a model in which spending on infrastructure decreases 
transportation costs.  One difference between their paper and this one is that in this model the 
transportation sector is a distinct sector in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition.  To 
study the interaction between industrial location and the transportation sector, Mori and Nishikimi 
(2002) study a model with three regions.  Two competing regions may export the same type of 
product to the third region.  There is no fixed costs in the transportation sector.  The transportation 
cost function is piecewise continuous: when the volume of transportation reaches a critical level, 
transportation costs decrease.  Mori and Nishikimi (2002) show that under this type of cost 
function, production and trade can be concentrated in one of the two competing regions, rather 
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than evenly distributed between them.  However, they do not study the choice of technology in the 
transportation sector. 
The choice of technologies has been studied in Zhou (2007a, 2007b), Hummels and Skiba 
(2004b), and Gong and Zhou (2014).  In Zhou (2007a), though countries only differ in factor 
endowment ex ante, countries may also differ in their chosen technologies ex post.  The choice of 
technology is then used to explain the phenomenon of “missing trade” in the sense that the volume 
of trade observed in reality is smaller than that predicted by traditional trade models.  Zhou (2007b) 
shows that the production functions generated from internal increasing returns and the choice of 
technologies are similar to those based on external increasing returns.  Trade always increases a 
country’s welfare in a two-sector model in which the agricultural sector has constant returns and 
average cost in the manufacturing sector may decrease without being bounded asymptotically by 
a given level of marginal cost.  Hummels and Skiba study a model in which a monopoly firm 
chooses between two transportation technologies: the first transportation technology requires no 
fixed costs, but has a positive marginal cost; the second transportation technology requires a fixed 
cost, but has no marginal cost.  If the volume of trade reaches a critical level, the monopoly 
transportation firm switches from the first technology to the second one.  In Gong and Zhou (2014), 
manufacturing firms located in a country with a more efficient financial sector choose more 
advanced technologies and this country has a comparative advantage in the production of 
manufactured goods.  The positive interaction between the transportation sector and the 
manufacturing sector is not addressed in the above models. 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 studies the equilibrium in which countries 
are in autarky.  Section 3 examines the equilibrium with international trade.  Section 4 addresses 
the interaction between the manufacturing sector and the transportation sector.  Section 5 discusses 
the possibility of the existence of multiple equilibria.  Section 6 focuses on the implications of 
population growth on the choices of technologies and the equilibrium prices.  Section 7 identifies 
some possible generalizations and extensions of the model and concludes. 
 
2. Countries in Autarky 
 There are two countries: home and foreign.  Population increases exogenously and the two 
countries have the same level of population L  at each moment.  We assume that individuals do 
not move between countries.  If a good is produced in a country, for consumption within this 
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country, no transportation service is needed.  If a good is exported to the other country, 
transportation service is needed.  Specifically, the country exporting a good provides the 
transportation service for this good.  In this section, we study the case that there is no international 
trade.  We focus on the presentation of the home country. 
There is a continuum of goods indexed by a number ]1,0[ .2  Goods enter into a 
consumer’s utility function in the same way.  A representative consumer’s consumption of good 
  is )(c  and the consumer’s utility function is specified as  dc )(ln
1
0 .  Labor is the only 
factor of production.  A representative individual is assumed to have no preference for leisure.  
Since firms earn zero profits in equilibrium, the wage income w  is the only source of income for 
an individual.  The price of good   is )(p .  A consumer’s budget constraint states that her total 
spending on all goods equals her wage income: wdcp   )()(
1
0
. 
This consumer takes the wage rate and the prices of goods as given and chooses her 
quantities of consumption to maximize her utility.  Her utility maximization leads to a fixed 
percentage of income spent on each good.  This consumer’s quantity of consumption of a 
domestically produced good is c .  For a domestically produced good, utility maximization requires 
that 
    wcp  .              (1) 
 It is well known that for countries with the same size, patterns of trade under increasing 
returns to scale are undetermined if countries do not differ in terms of comparative advantage.3  To 
determine which country exports which goods, we introduce the following specification (This 
specification is not necessary because what we need is that each country produces half of the goods 
under international trade).  An individual’s productivity in the production of a good is measured 
by a parameter  , which may be either 1  or 2 , and 021   .  Individuals in the two countries 
differ in their productivities in the production of different goods.  Specifically, each individual in 
the home country is able to supply 1  units of effective labor in the production of goods 
                                                 
2 As discussed in Neary (2003), the purpose of the assumption of a continuum of goods is to eliminate a firm’s market 
power in the labor market. 
3 With positive transportation costs, the trade pattern may be determined.  Yu (2005) provides a recent study on this 
issue. 
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)2/1,0[ , and 2  units of effective labor in the production of goods ]1,2/1[ .  Each 
individual in the foreign country is able to supply 2  units of effective labor in the production of 
goods ]1,2/1[ , and 1  units of effective labor in the production of goods )2/1,0[ . 
To produce each final good, we assume that there is a continuum of technologies indexed 
by a positive number n .  A higher value of n  indicates a more advanced technology.  The fixed 
cost in terms of labor units associated with technology n  is )(nf  and the corresponding marginal 
cost in terms of labor units is )(n .  A more advanced manufacturing technology has a higher 
fixed but a lower marginal cost of production: 0)(' nf  and 0)(' n .  For all goods in the range 
]1,0[ , the specifications of fixed and marginal costs are the same. 
Each manufactured good is produced by m  identical firms.  A manufacturing firm with an 
output level of x  has a total revenue of xp .  This firm’s total cost of hiring labor is  /)( wxf 
, thus its profit is  /)( wxfxp  .  Similar to Chao and Yu (1997), Neary (2003), Wang and 
Zhao (2007), and Zhou (2010), firms producing the same manufactured good are assumed to 
engage in Cournot competition.  Since there is a continuum of goods, a manufacturing firm does 
not have market power in the labor market.  A manufacturing firm takes as given the economy-
wide wage rate as well as the output and technology choices of the other firms in its sector.  Output 
and technology are chosen simultaneously, so there are no strategic considerations in the choice 
of technology.  A manufacturing firm’s optimal choice of output requires that 
    0



 w
x
pxp .             (2) 
 A manufacturing firm’s optimal choice of technology leads to the following equation 
which implies that a firm adopts a more advanced technology when its level of output is higher: 
    0)(')('  xnnf  .4            (3) 
 Ignoring the constraint that the number of firms should be an integer number, free entry 
and exit in the manufacturing sector means a manufacturing firm earns zero profits:5 
                                                 
4 The second order condition requires that 0''''  xf  .  A sufficient condition for this to be satisfied is that 0'' f  
and 0''  .  This second order condition is assumed to be satisfied and it is used later on to sign comparative statics 
results. 
5 For examples of oligopolistic competition with free entry, see Sections 3.7 and 4.5 of Brander (1995), Chao and Yu 
(1997), Zhang (2007), and Chen and Shieh (2011). 
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    0)( 

 wxfxp .            (4) 
For the market for a manufactured good, the total demand is cL .  Each of the m  firms 
supplies x  units of output and the total supply is xm .  The clearance of the market for a 
manufactured good in the home country requires that the quantity demanded equals the quantity 
supplied: 
    xmcL  .              (5) 
Under autarky, each country produces all goods in the range ]1,0[ .  In each period, the 
demand for labor in the production of one manufactured good is  /)( xfm  .  The total demand 
for labor is the sum of demand in the production of all goods.  The total supply of labor in a country 
is L .  Labor market equilibrium in a country requires that the quantity demanded equals the 
quantity supplied: 
  Ldxfmdxfm   



2
1
2/11
2/1
0
)]()()()[()]()()()[(      (6) 
In a Cournot equilibrium, when a firm chooses its level of output, it treats the output of 
other firms in its sector as given.  With this in mind, partial differentiation of (5) yields 2p
Lw
p
x 


.  Plugging the value of px  /  into (2) leads to the following equation stating that marginal 
revenue 



 
m
p 11  equals marginal cost 

 w : 
    

 w
m
p 



  11 .             (7) 
 In each period, equations (1) and (3)-(7) form a system of six equations defining a set of 
six variables p , c , w , m , n , and x .  An autarky equilibrium is a tuple ( p , c , w , m , n , x ) 
satisfying this set of six equations.  The wage rate is used as the numeraire: 1w .  
 With the specification of the utility function, equal amount of workers will be allocated in 
the production of each manufactured good.  A rearrangement of the first-order output condition 
(7) yields 


)1( 

m
mp .  Substituting this result into the free entry condition (4) leads to 
fxfm /)(  .  Next, combination of equation (1), product-market clearing condition (5), and 
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the free entry condition (4) yields )( xfmL   .  Plugging the value of fxfm /)(   into 
)( xfmL    leads to 
    0)( 2  xfLf  .            (8) 
Equations (3) and (8) form a system of two equations defining two endogenous variables 
x  and n  as functions of exogenous parameters.  From (3) and (8), it can be shown that 0/ ddx  
and 0/ ddn .  By using (3), it can be shown that   0/)( 2 



d
dx
x
f
d
xxfd .  From this 
inequality and (4), 0/ ddp .  Thus, for a good that individuals have a higher effective supply of 
labor, the output of this good is higher, and a more advanced technology is adopted in the 
production of this good.  Also, the price of this good is lower.  The intuition is as follows.  Since 
the effective supply of labor for a good is higher, more output will be produced.  This makes the 
adoption of more advanced technologies more profitable because the higher fixed cost can be 
spread to a higher level of output.  From the condition for a manufacturing firm’s optimal choice 
of technology, a more advanced technology is associated with a lower average cost.  When the 
average cost is lower, the price is also lower because the price equals the average cost when a firm 
makes zero profits. 
Since individuals in the two countries differ in their abilities in the production of the two 
groups of goods, the prices of the two groups of goods will be different in the two countries.  The 
price for a good )2/1,0[  is lower in the home country.  The price for a good ]1,2/1[  is 
lower in the foreign country.  This price difference leads to the possibility of trade between the 
two countries.  In the equilibrium with international trade, the home country specializes in the 
production of goods )2/1,0[  and the foreign country specializes in the production of goods 
]1,2/1[ .  To simplify notation, for the rest of the paper, 1  is normalized to one. 
 
3. Equilibrium with international trade 
Transportation services are needed so that trade between the two countries is possible.  
Different from the iceberg transportation technology, in this model labor rather than goods 
themselves is used in the production of transportation service.  Variables in the transportation 
sector are denoted by a subscript s , s  for service provided by the transportation sector.  For 
example, the price of transportation service is sp .   
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There is a continuum of transportation technologies indexed by a positive number sn .  The 
fixed cost in terms of labor units associated with technology sn  is )( ss nf  and the corresponding 
marginal cost in terms of labor units is )( ss n .  A more advanced transportation technology has 
a higher fixed but a lower marginal cost of production: 0)(' ss nf  and 0)(' ss n .  Once a 
transportation firm in a country incurs a fixed cost, it can transport final goods from this country 
to the other one at a corresponding constant marginal cost.6   
Since there are fixed costs in the transportation sector, when the size of the population is 
sufficiently small, the volume of export will not be enough to cover the fixed costs of 
transportation.  Though prices of different groups of goods are different in the two countries, there 
is no international trade when the size of the population is sufficiently small.  When the size of the 
population grows to a sufficient large level, firms providing transportation service will emerge in 
each country.  A transportation firm’s profit is wxfxp ssssss )(   .  For the entry of a 
transportation firm to be profitable, we need 0s .  If this condition valid, international trade 
starts.  At the beginning of international trade, the size of the market may be large enough for only 
one transportation firm.  As population keeps on growing, the size of the market is larger and 
additional firms providing transportation service will emerge in each country.   
In a symmetric equilibrium of international trade, since the two countries are the mirror 
images of each other (they have the same amount of labor and have access to the same set of 
technologies), the wage rates in the two countries will be the same.  In a symmetric equilibrium, 
the prices of final goods produced in a given country will be the same.  Also, prices of all imported 
final goods will be the same.  Variables associated with the foreign country carry an asterisk mark. 
The markets for a manufactured good in the two countries are integrated.  That is, a 
manufacturing firm could not engage in price discrimination in different countries.  The price of a 
good produced in the home country is still denoted by p .  For a good imported, its price is denoted 
                                                 
6 In this model, a transportation firm provides services only to manufacturing firms in the same sector.  It can be shown 
that the intuition and main results of the model are still valid if a transportation firm provides services to manufacturing 
firms in all sectors.  The reason is as follows.  Suppose a transportation firm can provide services to all manufacturing 
sectors.  For the market for transportation service, now we add the demand from all sectors and add the supply of all 
sectors.  Then we set quantity demanded for transportation service equals quantity supplied of transportation service.  
Since all the sectors are symmetric, intuitively, we multiply both the demand and the supply of transportation service 
by the number of manufactured goods produced by a country.  In equilibrium the condition for the clearance of the 
market for transportation will be the same as the case that a transportation firm provides service to only one 
manufacturing sector. 
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by ip , i  for imported.  Since one unit of final good is combined with one unit of transportation 
service to produce one unit of exported final good, the price paid by a foreign consumer for an 
imported final good is  
   si ppp * .              (9) 
A domestic consumer’s consumption of an imported final good is ic .  Similar to equation 
(1), for an imported final good, a domestic consumer’s utility maximization requires that  
    wcp ii  .            (10) 
A manufacturing firm takes the price of transportation service as given and a firm providing 
transportation service takes the price of a manufactured good as given.7  When there are multiple 
transportation firms providing transportation service for the same final good, they engage in 
Cournot competition.  A firm providing transportation service takes the wage rate as given and 
chooses its levels of output and technology to maximize its profit.  The optimal output choice for 
a firm providing transportation service leads to the familiar condition that the marginal revenue 
equals the marginal cost: 
    w
x
p
xp s
s
s
ss 
 .           (11) 
 A transportation firm’s optimal choice of technology requires that 
    0)(')('  sssss xnnf  .          (12) 
 For each final good, if the number of transportation firms is not restricted to be an integer 
number, free entry and exit in the transportation sector means that a transportation firm earns 
profits of zero: 
    0)(  wxfxp sssss  .          (13) 
For each final good, each of the sm  firms transports sx  units of this good abroad and the 
total amount of export is ss xm .  Each of the L  consumers in the foreign country demands *ic  
units of this imported final good and the total demand of this final good by foreign consumers is 
*
i
cL .  The quantity supplied and quantity demanded for a transported good should be equal: 
                                                 
7 Salinger (1986) studies implications of vertical integration on social welfare.  In his model, similar to many models 
in the literature on vertical integration, it is assumed that an upstream firm takes the price of a downstream firm as 
given.  Also, a downstream firm takes the price of an upstream firm as given. 
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    *iss cLxm  .            (14) 
 For the market for a final good, the total demand for it is the sum of the demand from the 
home country and that from the foreign country.  The demand from the home country is cL .  The 
demand from the foreign country is *icL .  Thus the total demand for a final good is *icLcL  .  
Each of the m  manufacturing firms supplies x  units of output and the total supply for a final good 
is xm .  The clearance of the market for a final good requires that the quantity demanded equals 
the quantity supplied:8 
    )()()(*)(  xmcLcL i  .         (15) 
 For the labor market in the home country, the demand for labor is the sum of the demand 
from the manufacturing sector and that from the transportation sector.  For the manufacturing 
sector, each final good requires )( xfm   units of labor for production.  For the transportation 
sector, the demand for labor for a good is )( ssss xfm  .  The total demand for labor of a final 
good is 2/)]()([ ssss xfmxfm   .  The home country produces goods in the range )2/1,0[  
and the total demand for labor in the home country is  dxfmxfm ssss )]()([
2/1
0
 .  The 
total supply of labor in the home country is L .  Labor market equilibrium in the home country 
requires that the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied:9 
   Ldxfmxfm ssss   )]()([
2/1
0
.         (16) 
 Since firms engage in Cournot competition, when a transportation firm chooses its level of 
output, it treats the output of other transportation firms as given.  With this in mind, partial 
differentiation of (14) yields 
    2*)(
*
is
s
p
Lw
p
x 

 .           (17) 
 Plugging the value of ss px  /  from equation (17) into equation (11) yields 
                                                 
8 In this model, the quantity of the goods transported should not exceed the quantity of the goods produced.  Equation 
(15) can be used to show that this constraint is satisfied.  In this equation, )(* icL  is the quantity of the goods 
transported and )()(  xm  is the quantity of the goods produced.  With )(cL  larger than zero, )(* icL  will be 
smaller than )()(  xm . 
9 Labor market equilibrium in the foreign country is similar to that in the home country and is not presented here.  
With Walras’s law in mind, labor market clears when all other markets clear. 
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 
Lw
pxpw iss .          (18) 
 Similar to the derivation of equation (17), partial differentiation of equation (15) yields 
    
p
p
p
cL
p
cL
p
x i
i
i



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


 *
*
*  
     22 *)(
*
ip
Lw
p
L  .          (19) 
 Plugging the value of px  /  from equation (19) and the value of x  from equation (4) into 
equation (2) yields 
   0
]**)([
*)(
)( 22
22






LpwpL
pp
wp
wfpw
i
i

 .        (20) 
 In a symmetric equilibrium, foreign variables are equal to their domestic counterparts: 
*ww  , *ii pp  , and *ii cc  .  Equations (1), (3), (4), (9), (10), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), 
(18), and (20) form a system of twelve equations defining twelve variables p , ip , sp , c , ic , w , 
m , sm , n , sn , x , and sx  as functions of exogenous parameters.  An equilibrium with international 
trade is a tuple ( p , ip , sp , c , ic , w , m , sm , n , sn , x , sx ) satisfying this set of twelve equations.   
 
4. Complementarities between Manufacturing and Transport Sectors 
Casual observation shows that regions with better transportation infrastructure are more 
likely to attract investments in the manufacturing sector and regions with higher levels of 
manufacturing activities are more likely to be connected by railways, highways, and airports.  In 
this section, we establish complementarities of technology adoptions between the manufacturing 
sector and the transportation sector. 
First, we study the impact of a change in the level of technology in the transportation sector 
on the level of technology in the manufacturing sector.  If the level of transportation technology is 
exogenously given, we can establish the following system of three equations defining three 
variables n , ip , and p  as functions of exogenous parameters:10 
                                                 
10 The derivation of equations (21a)-(21c) is as follows.  First, plugging the value of x  from equation (4) into equation 
(3) yields (21a).  Second, plugging the value of ip  (the same as *ip ) from equation (9) into equation (20) yields 
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The following proposition studies the impact of a change in the level of technology in the 
transportation sector on the level of technology in the manufacturing sector. 
 
 Proposition 1: If the level of technology in the transportation sector is exogenously given, 
a more advanced technology in the transportation sector leads firms in the manufacturing sector to 
choose a more advanced technology. 
Proof: Partial differentiation of the system of equations (21a)-(21c) with respect to n , ip , 
p , and sn  yields 
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.        (22) 
Let   denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of (22).  
An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (22) leads to  






 /321
sss nppdn
dn .          (23) 
To determine the sign of sdndn / , we need to determine the sign of  .  To determine the 
sign of  , we conduct the following stability analysis.  Suppose that a manufacturing firm chooses 
a more advanced technology if the marginal benefit of a more advanced technology is higher than 
the marginal cost.  The marginal benefit of a more advanced technology is the amount of marginal 
                                                 
(21b).  Third, plugging the value of sx  from equation (13) and the value of ip  from equation (9) into equation (18) 
yields (21c). 
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cost saved ( x' ) and the marginal cost is the amount of additional fixed cost ( 'f ).  Since 
)/(  pfx  from equation (4), the difference between the marginal benefit and the marginal 
cost of a more advanced manufacturing technology is ')/(' fpf   .  Thus the middle part 
of equation (21a) shows the evolution of n : 
   '' f
p
fn 




 . 
For a manufacturing firm, when its marginal cost is higher than its marginal revenue, it will 
reduce its output.  When a firm has market power in the goods market, a decrease in the level of 
output will lead to an increase in the level of price it receives.  This motivates our assumption that 
the price of a manufacturing firm increases if the difference between its marginal cost and marginal 
revenue increases.  A manufacturing firm’s marginal cost is   and its marginal revenue is 
xpxp  / .  By plugging the value of x  from equation (4) and the value of xp  /  from equation 
(19) into xpxp  / , the difference between a manufacturing firm’s marginal cost and marginal 
revenue is 





])([
)(
22
22
i
i
ppL
pp
p
fp

 .  Thus the middle part of equation (21b) shows the 
evolution of p .  Similarly, suppose that the price of a transportation firm increases if the difference 
between its marginal cost and marginal revenue increases.  The difference between a transportation 
firm’s marginal cost and marginal revenue is 





)(
)( 2
ss
ss
ss pL
ppf
p

 , thus the middle part of 
equation (21c) shows the evolution of sp .  As discussed in Metzler (1945) and Takayama (1985, 
p. 316), for the system (21a)-(21c) to be stable, it is necessary that the leading principal minors of 
  will alternative in sign.  That is, stability requires that 0/1  n , 0
22
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0 .   
Partial differentiation of equation (21c) leads to 
0''
'
'
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
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
. 
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From equation (21a), 0/1  p .  From equation (21b), 0/2  sp .  With 0 , from (23), 
0/ sdndn .  
 
 To understand Proposition 1, a more advanced technology in the transportation sector leads 
to a decrease in the price of transportation service and thus an increase in the quantity of export.  
This increases the total demand for a final good and makes the adoption of a more advanced 
technology in the manufacturing sector more profitable because the higher level of fixed cost 
associated with a more advanced technology can be spread to a higher level of output.11   
Second, we study the impact of a change in the level of technology in the manufacturing 
sector on the level of technology in the transportation sector.  If the level of manufacturing 
technology is exogenously given, we can derive the following system of three equations defining 
sn , ip , and sp  as functions of exogenous parameters:12    
  0
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ppppL
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p

 ,      (24a) 
  0''2 
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s fp
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 ,         (24b) 
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ss
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ss pL
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The following proposition studies the impact of a change in the level of technology in the 
manufacturing sector on the level of technology in the transportation sector. 
 
Proposition 2: If the level of technology in the manufacturing sector is exogenously given, 
a more advanced technology in the manufacturing sector leads firms in the transportation sector to 
choose a more advanced technology. 
                                                 
11 In a model with monopolistic competition and a constant elasticity of demand, a firm’s scale of production does not 
change with a decrease in the level of transportation costs.  With oligopolistic competition in this model, a firm’s scale 
of production increases when transportation costs decrease.  It is this increase in the scale of production leads firms in 
the manufacturing sector to choose more advanced technologies. 
12 The derivation of equations (24a)-(24c) is as follows.  First, plugging the value of ip  (the same as *ip ) from 
equation (9) into equation (20) yields (24a).  Second, plugging the value of sx  from equation (13) into equation (12) 
yields (24b).  Third, plugging the value of sx  from equation (13) into equation (18) yields (24c).  
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Proof: Partial differentiation of equations (24a)-(24c) with respect to sn , ip , p , and n  
yields 
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Let   denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of (25).  
An application of Cramer’s rule on the system (25) leads to  





 /321
ppndn
dn
s
s .          (26) 
To determine the sign of dndns / , we need to determine the sign of  .  To determine the 
sign of  , we conduct the following stability analysis.  Similar to the argument in the proof of 
Proposition 1, suppose that the price of a manufacturing firm increases if the difference between 
its marginal cost and its marginal revenue increases.  Then the middle part of equation (24a) shows 
the evolution of p .  Suppose that a transportation firm chooses a more advanced technology if its 
marginal benefit is larger than its marginal cost.  The marginal benefit of a more advanced 
transportation technology is ss x'  and the marginal cost is 'sf .  Since )/( ssss pfx   from 
equation (13), the difference between the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of a more 
advanced transportation technology is ')/(' sssss fpf   .  Thus the middle part of equation 
(24b) shows the evolution of sn .  Suppose the price of a transportation firm increases if the 
difference between its marginal cost and marginal revenue increases, then the middle part of 
equation (24c) shows the evolution of sp .  For the system (24a)-(24c) to be stable, it is necessary 
that the leading principal minors of   will alternative in sign.  That is, stability requires that 
01 
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Partial differentiation of equation (24a) leads to 
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From equation (24b), 0/2  sp .  From equation (24c), 0/3  p .  With 0 , from (26), 
0/ dndns .   
 
 To understand Proposition 2, the price of an exported final good is the sum of the domestic 
price and the price of the transportation service.  A more advanced technology in the manufacturing 
sector leads to a decrease in the domestic price of a final good and thus decreases the price of an 
exported good.  As a result, the quantity demanded for export is higher.  The adoption of more 
advanced technologies in the transportation sector becomes more profitable because the higher 
fixed cost associated with a more advanced technology can be spread to a higher level of output. 
One implication from Propositions 1 and 2 is that technological improvements in the 
manufacturing and transportation sectors can be reinforcing.  Lower transportation costs increase 
the volume of trade and greater trade volumes increase productivity in the transportation sector 
and lower prices. 
 
5. The number of equilibria 
With the positive interaction between the manufacturing and transportation sectors, 
multiple equilibria may exist.  In this section, we study the number of equilibrium.  From equations 
(21a) and (24a)-(24c), we can derive the following two equations defining the levels of 
technologies in the two sectors as functions of exogenous parameters: 
    0'
'
'' 


  sssss fLff
ff  ,             (27a) 
  0
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
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f
ff
L
f ss
s

.            (27b) 
 The existence of multiple equilibria is affected by the specifications of the marginal and 
fixed costs of production in the two sectors.  Unfortunately we are not able to provide illuminating 
conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium.  In the following, we provide an example in 
which the number of equilibrium is unique and another example in which there are multiple 
equibria. 
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Unique equilibrium: Suppose that nnf )( , nn /1)(  , ss nnf )( , ss nn /1)(  , and 
100L .  With the above specification, solving the system of equations (27a) and (27b) 
numerically by Matlab leads to the unique set of technologies in the two sectors: 3376.27sn  
and 0458.12sn . 
 
Multiple equilibria: Suppose that nnf )( , 2/1)( nn  , ss nnf )( , 2)/(1)( ss nn  , and 
9L .  With the above specification, equations (27a) and (27b) becomes  
   02)()( 225.05.2  nnnn ss , 
   0)(4 545  snnn . 
Solving the above system of equations numerically by Matlab leads to two sets of solutions: one 
set of solution is 0067.0n and 0235.0sn ; the other set of solution is 2211.4n  and 
3402.2sn . 
 
 When there are multiple equilibria, the following proposition shows that they can be Pareto 
ranked. 
 
 Proposition 3: An equilibrium with lower levels of technologies in the two sectors is 
dominated by an equilibrium with higher levels of technologies in the two sectors. 
 Proof: With 1w , a consumer’s utility increases when p  and sp  decrease.  First, we 
show that p  decreases with n .  From equation (4), the price of a final good can be expressed as 
xfp /  .  By employing equation (3), the relationship between the price of a final good and 
the level of technology in the manufacturing sector is given by 
dn
dx
x
f
dn
dp
2 .  From equation (3), 
0/ dndx .  Thus 0/ dndp .   
Second, we show that sp  decreases with sn .  From equation (13), the price of 
transportation service can be expressed as ssss xfp /  .  By employing equation (12), the 
relationship between the price of transportation service and the level of technology in the 
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transportation sector is given by 
s
s
s
s
s
s
dn
dx
x
f
dn
dp
2 .  From equation (12), 0/ ss dndx .  Thus 
0/ ss dndp .  
 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows.  Since the wage rate is normalized to one, 
a consumer’s utility increases when the prices of final goods decrease.  A more advanced 
technology leads to a lower average cost.  This leads to a lower price of a final good because the 
price is equal to average cost when firms earn a profit of zero.  As a result, a consumer’s welfare 
is higher when more advanced technologies are adopted. 
The existence of multiple equilibria has been used to explain the phenomenon of “poverty 
trap” in developing countries (Murphy et al., 1989).  This is related to the complementarity issue 
which has received much attention in the study of economic development.  When multiple 
equilibria exist, an economy may be trapped in the equilibrium with a lower level of social welfare.  
More specifically, a firm considering investment in the manufacturing sector may hesitate to invest 
if transportation infrastructure is poor.  A firm considering investment in the transportation sector 
may hesitate to invest if this firm expects that the low level of activities in the manufacturing sector 
leads to a low demand for transportation services.  If the transportation sector is the main binding 
constraint of economic development, this model suggests that government intervention such as 
investments in the transportation sector will increase social welfare.  However, in reality, other 
factors such as civil conflicts might play more significant roles in discouraging investments than 
a poor transportation infrastructure and an improvement in the transportation sector may not 
necessarily lead to a better economic performance. 
 
6. Implications of population growth 
With technologies determined endogenously in manufacturing and transportation sectors, 
the remaining exogenous parameter in this model is the size of the population.13  The following 
                                                 
13 In this model, the size of the population measures the size of the market.  In reality, countries with large size of 
population such as China and India may not necessarily have a large market for a given good because the level of 
income is low or consumers in different regions of a country are not integrated. 
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proposition studies the impact of an increase in the size of the population on the levels of 
technologies in the two sectors and the prices charged by the two sectors.14 
 
 Proposition 4: Manufacturing firms and transportation firms adopt more advanced 
technologies and the prices of final goods and transportation services decrease when the size of 
the population is larger. 
Proof: Equations (21a) and (24a)-(24c) lead to the following system of four equations 
defining four variables p , sp , n , and sn  as functions of exogenous parameters.15 
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Partial differentiation of equations (28a)-(28d) with respect to n , ip , sn , sp , and L  leads 
to 
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14 This type of inquiry is legitimate when the equilibrium is unique.  When there are multiple equilibria, it is understood 
that we limit the analysis to a locally stable neighborhood of an equilibrium.  When multiple equilibria exist, 
comparative statics can be based on the comparison of highest equilibrium or the lowest equilibrium (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1994). 
15 Equation (28b) is a combination of equation (24a) and equation (24c). 
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Let V  denote the determinant of the above coefficient matrix of endogenous variables.  
An application of Cramer’s rule leads to  
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To determine the signs of dLdn / , dLdp / , dLdns / , and dLdps / , we need to determine 
the signs of 
n
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 3232 , and V .  To determine the signs of 
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 3232 , and V , we conduct the following stability analysis.  
Similar to the arguments used in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, the middle parts of equation 
(28a) shows the evolution of n , the middle part of equation (28b) shows the evolution of p , the 
middle part of equation (28c) shows the evolution of sn , and the middle part of equation (28d) 
shows the evolution of sp .  Thus we have the following equations showing the evolution of n , p
, sn , and sp : 


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p
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
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
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)( 2
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ss pL
ppf
p

 .            (30d) 
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For the system (30a)-(30d) to be stable, it is necessary that the leading principal minors of 
v  will alternative in sign.  That is, stability requires that 0/1  nV , 0
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To determine the sign of )/)(/()/)(/( 3232 ssss pVnVnVpV  , following 
Samuelson (1983, chap. 8), for the subsystem 2V  and 3V , if 2V  holds and the evolution of sn  is 
given by (30c), then the evolution of this subsystem is as follows: 
   0
])()[(
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
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s
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f 



 . 
For this subsystem 2V  and 3V , a characteristic root   is defined by 
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. 
The above expression leads to 
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Stability of the subsystem 2V  and 3V  requires that 0 .  Partial differentiation of 2V  reveals that 
0/2  spV .  From (31), 03232 
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V , from equations 
(29a)-(29d), it is clear that 0/ dLdn , 0/ dLdns , 0/ dLdp , and 0/ dLdps .        
 
 An increase in the size of the population increases the demand for each final good and thus 
leads to the adoption of more advanced technologies in the two sectors.  If more countries are 
integrated into the world trade system, this can also encourage the adoption of more advanced 
technologies. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 For a modern economy, an important feature of the transportation sector is the existence of 
significant degrees of increasing returns.  The volume of transportation thus affects a transportation 
firm’s choices of technologies and the levels of transportation costs are endogenously determined 
by the volume of transportation.  In this paper, we have shown that it is tractable to incorporate 
increasing returns in the transportation sector into a general equilibrium model in which 
manufacturing firms and transportation firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose 
technologies optimally.  The model is tractable and the results are derived analytically.  We show 
that technological improvements in the manufacturing sector and in the transportation sector are 
reinforcing and multiple equilibria with different levels of social welfare may exist.  When the size 
of the population increases, firms adopt more advanced technologies and the prices of final goods 
decrease. 
The framework may be generalized and extended in various directions.  First, in this model, 
there is only type of goods: manufactured goods.  An agricultural good with constant returns to 
scale production function can be incorporated into the model.  If consumers have a homothetic 
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preference, it can be shown that for countries with access to the same production technologies, a 
country with a higher population has a comparative advantage in the production of the 
manufactured goods.  Second, in this model, labor is the only factor of production.  To address the 
role of capital accumulation in the process of development, capital can be incorporated into the 
model.  Third, in the process of industrialization, different stages of growth might be driven by 
different factors.   In the first stage of industrialization, growth was mainly driven by market 
expansion.  In the second stage of industrialization, growth was mainly driven by research and 
development effort.  Market expansion made research and development spending more profitable.  
The model may be extended to incorporate endogenous development of new technologies.  Finally, 
transportation costs can be viewed as a special kind of transaction costs.  The interaction between 
transaction costs and the division of labor can be an interesting avenue for future research. 
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